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Abstract 
The current study investigated whether 18-months-olds attribute opaque mental states when 
they solve false belief tests, or simply rely on behavioural cues available in the stimuli. 
Infants experienced either a trick blindfold that looked opaque but could be seen through, or 
an opaque blindfold. Then both groups of infants observed an actor wearing the same 
blindfold that they had themselves experienced, whilst a puppet removed an object from its 
location. Anticipatory eye movements revealed that infants who experienced the opaque 
blindfold expected the actor’s action in accord with her having a false belief about the 
object's location, but infants who experienced the trick blindfold did not. The results suggest 
that 18-months-olds used self-experience with the blindfold to assess the actor's visual access, 
and updated her knowledge/belief state accordingly. These data constitute compelling 
evidence that 18-months-olds infer perceptual access and appreciate its causal role in altering 
epistemic states of others. 
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Recent studies have reported that human infants are able to spontaneously understand that 
others' actions are driven by their beliefs about states of affairs in the real world, even when 
these beliefs are false (Buttelmann, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009; Kovács, Téglás, & 
Endress, 2010; Scott & Baillargeon, 2009; Song, Onishi, Baillargeon, & Fisher, 2008; 
Southgate, Chevallier, & Csibra, 2010; Southgate, Senju, & Csibra, 2007; Surian, Caldi, & 
Sperber, 2007). These findings have been met with scepticism because children at this age 
usually fail traditional explicit tests of false belief understanding, leading some to suggest 
that infants’ success reflects a reliance on behavioural cues rather than mental state 
attribution (Perner & Ruffman, 2005). Such alternative explanations cannot be completely 
ruled out because all the above studies used behavioural cues to indicate the presence of true 
or false beliefs. 
 A possible way to address this charge is to create a paradigm in which different infants 
would attribute different mental states to exactly the same stimuli. An experimental 
manipulation that could lead to such an ideal experiment was originally proposed by Heyes 
(1998), and recently implemented by Meltzoff and Brooks (2008) to test the attribution of 
visual access in 18-months-olds. In that study, infants were provided with first-person 
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experience with either an opaque blindfold or a trick blindfold that appeared opaque but was 
in fact transparent. Infants who experienced the trick blindfold subsequently followed a 
blindfolded adult’s gaze, but those who experienced the opaque blindfold did not, suggesting 
that infants' attribution of perceptual access to others is modulated by their own past 
experience of visual access. 
 In the current study, we investigated whether 18-month-olds would use their own past 
experience of visual access to attribute perception and consequent beliefs to others. Infants 
first received experience with a visually identical opaque or trick blindfold, and subsequently 
watched a video sequence in which an actor wore the same blindfold while an object was 
displaced in front of her. By measuring visual anticipation, we assessed whether infants own 
experience with the blindfold influenced their prediction of where the actor would search for 
the displaced object. Since the infant could not observe either themselves or others wearing 
the blindfold, they had no opportunity to acquire possible associations between blindfold-
wearing and observable behaviours, and thus any differences in expectations that infants 
displayed following the different blindfold experiences would necessarily be the result of 
attributing unobservable mental states to others. 
 
Methods 
 Thirty-six infants (13 female; aged 17.5 to 18.5 months, mean age 18.0 months) were 
randomly assigned to an Opaque (n=18) and a Trick (n=17) condition. Further 12 infants 
were also tested but excluded from the analyses because they did not show anticipatory 
saccades by the end of the familiarization trials (4; 2 in the Opaque and 2 in the Trick 
condition), looked away from the stimuli at the critical moment in the test trial (4; 2 in the 
Opaque and 2 in the Trick condition), did not look at either window on the test trial (3, 1 in 
the Opaque and 2 in the Trick condition), or did not complete the familiarization phase (1 
infant in the Trick condition). During familiarization, the infants were introduced to one of 
two pairs of blindfolds, made of black cloth with a pink trimming around their edging to 
make them easily identifiable. The opaque and trick blindfolds were identical, apart from the 
absence of a thick mid-layer in the trick blindfold, which made it possible to see through. 
Infants were presented with various pictures and toys while the blindfold was interposed 
between their eyes and the objects, with the experimenter asking ‘Where’s the [object 
label]?’ This familiarization lasted for 5 minutes, and provided the infants with experience 
about the optical properties of the opaque vs. the trick (see-through) blindfold. 
 During the test phase, infants watched a video sequence similar to the one used in 
Southgate et al. (2007), presented on a Tobii 1750 eye tracker. In the video, a female actor sat 
behind a panel with two windows, in front of which were placed two boxes. In the first two 
events, a small toy was seen on one of the boxes, then the windows were illuminated and a 
chime sounded simultaneously to indicate that the actor was going to reach through one of 
the windows. After a 1750-ms delay, the actor reached through the window toward the toy. In 
the third and fourth trial, a puppet appeared, opened the lid of one of the boxes, placed a toy 
into it, closed the lid and left the scene. Then the windows were illuminated, the chime 
sounded, and after a 1750 ms delay the actor reached through the window corresponding to 
the location of the toy. In the final (fifth) trial, the puppet placed the toy into the left-hand 
box, after which the actor put on the blindfold previously experienced by the infant. The 
puppet then removed the toy from the box and left the scene with it. Once the puppet had 
disappeared, the actor removed the blindfold, the windows were illuminated, and the chime 
sounded. (See the video in the supplementary material.) 
 
Results 
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 On the basis of the eye tracking data, we coded the direction of infants' first saccade 
following the illumination of the windows, and the differential looking score (DLS), which 
was calculated by subtracting total looking time to the right window from total looking time 
to the left window and dividing it by the total looking time to both windows (Senju, 
Southgate, White, & Frith, 2009). We found that 14 of the 18 infants made first saccades 
towards the left window in the Opaque condition (p= .031, g = .278, binomial test), while 
only 6 of the 18 infants did so in the Trick condition (p= .238, g = .167, binomial test). Thus, 
the location of first gaze was influenced by infants' experience with the blindfold (p= .018, ø 
= .447, Fischer’s Exact Test). The DLS also significantly differed between groups (t(33) = 
2.668, p = .012, d =.871), being above zero in the Opaque condition (DLS = .39, t(17) = 2.32, 
p = .03, d = .549), but not in the Trick condition (DLS = -.31, t(17) = -1.53, p = .15, d = .360). 
 
Discussion 
 That infants in the two conditions had different expectations about the actor's action 
after object displacement suggests that infants used self-experience with the blindfold to 
assess the actor's visual access, updated her belief state accordingly, and used this attribution 
for action prediction. Infants in the Opaque condition expected the actor to search in the left 
box, suggesting they attributed a false belief to the actor. Infants in the Trick condition, by 
contrast, did not show such a bias, suggesting that they did not attribute a belief about a 
specific location to the actor: As the object had been removed from the scene, the actor 
should have no strong basis on which to choose one box over the other. The current finding is 
inconsistent with the proposal that infants rely on behavioural cues available in the stimuli to 
make predictions (e.g., Perner & Ruffman, 2005) because the same video sequence was 
presented in both conditions. The current results strongly suggest that 18-months-olds pay 
attention to others’ visual access to events and appreciate its causal role in altering belief 
states. 
Meltzoff & Brooks (2008) offer several alternative explanations for how infants could 
go from first person experience with the blindfold to understanding its effects on another 
person. However, even the leanest interpretation of such first-to-third person extrapolation 
would entail the understanding of the unobservable mental state of seeing (Heyes, 1998; Penn 
& Povinelli, 2007; Meltzoff & Brooks, 2008). Thus, at the very least, infants encoded that the 
actor either could or could not see the displacement of the object when she wore the blindfold, 
and used this information to correctly anticipate her future behaviour. The current results 
cannot clarify whether the link between visual access and consequent behaviour is mediated 
by the attribution of an additional mental state concept, such as belief, by 18-months-old 
infants.  
Nevertheless, the current finding makes a strong case that the emerging evidence of the 
capacity for mental state attribution in infants should not be dismissed or discarded as 
“precursors” of an adult theory of mind, relying on simpler, non-mentalistic processing. Our 
finding, considered together with the other studies of early belief attribution reviewed here, 
points to the existence of a genuine ability to attribute mental states from at least the middle 
of the second year of life, if not earlier (Kovács et al., 2010). 
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